even in the Holy Prophet’s lifetime.

Exercise of Judgment by the Companions

It is a mistake to suppose that the exercise of judgment to meet the new circumstances only came into vogue with the four great jurists (Imāms) whose opinion is now generally accepted in the Islamic world. The work had begun, as already shown, in the Holy Prophet’s lifetime, since it was impossible to refer every case to him. After the Holy Prophet’s death, the principle of Ijtihād obtained a wider prevalence, and as new areas were added to the material and spiritual realm of Islām, the need of resorting to the exercise of judgment became greater. Nor did the Caliphs arrogate all authority to themselves. They had a council to which every important case was referred, and its decision by a majority of votes was accepted by the Caliph as well as by the Muslim public. Thus Suyūṭi writes in his History of the Caliphs on the authority of Abū al-Qāsim Baghwi reporting from Maimūn son of Mihrān: “When a case came before Abū Bakr (the first Caliph), he used to consult the Book of God; if he found anything in it by which he could decide, he did so; if he did not find it in the Book, and he knew of a practice or saying of the Messenger of God, he decided according to it; and if he was unable to find anything there, he used to question the Muslims if they knew of any decision of the Holy Prophet in a matter of that kind, and a company of people thus gathered round him, every one of whom stated what he knew from the Holy Prophet, and Abū Bakr would say, ‘Praise be to God Who had kept among us those who remember what the Holy Prophet said’; but if he was unable to find anything in the practice of the Holy Prophet, he gathered the heads of the people, and the best of them, and consulted them, and if they agreed upon one opinion (by a majority) he decided accordingly.”2

It is true that it was not exactly a legislative assembly in the modern sense, but the nucleus of a legislative assembly can clearly be seen in this council which decided all important affairs and, when necessary, promulgated laws. It was also supreme in both religious and temporal matters. The same rule was followed by ‘Umar, the second Caliph, who resorted to Ijtihād very freely, but took care always