it goes against that of their master. The third degree of Ijtihād — pertaining to particular cases — was attainable by later jurists who could solve special cases that came before them which had not been decided by the jurists of the first two degrees, but such decisions must be in absolute accordance with the opinion of the latter. The door of such Ijtihād is also supposed to have been closed after the sixth century of Hijrah. And at present, it is said, there can be only muqallidīn, literally “those who follow another in what he says or does, firmly believing him to be right therein, regardless of proof or evidence.” They may only quote a decision (fatwā) from any of the earlier authorities, or when there are differing opinions of the earlier jurisconsults they can choose one of them, but they cannot question the correctness of what has been said. Thus Ijtihād which was never considered to be an absolute authority by the great Imāms or their immediate disciples is now practically placed on the same level with the Holy Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth and hence no one now is considered to be fit for Ijtihād.

The door of Ijtihād is still open

But it is a mistake to suppose that the door of Ijtihād was closed after the four Imāms mentioned above. It is quite clear that the free exercise of judgment was allowed by the Holy Qur’ān, while both the Holy Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth explicitly allowed analogical deduction (istinbāṭ), and it was on the basis of these directions that the Muslim world continued to exercise its judgment in making laws for itself. The Companions made use of it even in the Holy Prophet’s lifetime, when it was not convenient to refer a matter to him personally; and after his death, as new circumstances arose, new laws were made by a majority of the Caliph’s council and new decisions given by the learned among the Companions; the next generation (Tābi‘ūn. ) added up to the knowledge of the Companions; and each succeeding generation, not satisfied with what the previous one had achieved, freely applied its judgment.

The second century saw the four great luminaries appear on the horizon of Ijtihād, and the appearance of these great jurists one after another, each evidently dissatisfied with what his predecessor had achieved, is another conclusive argument that Islām permitted