nor with their enemies, and it states that they were left alone (4:90). All these cases show that the ḥadīth relating to the killing of those who change their religion applied only to those who fought against the Muslims.
Turning to Fiqh, we find that the jurists first lay down a principle quite opposed to the Holy Qur’ān, namely that the life of a man may be taken on account of his apostasy. Thus in the Hidāyah: “The murtadd (apostate) shall have Islām presented to him whether he is a free man or a slave; if he refuses, he must be killed” (H.I, p. 576). But this principle is contradicted immediately afterwards when the apostate is called “an unbeliever at war (kāfir-un ḥarabiyy-un) whom the invitation of Islām has already reached” (H.I, p. 577). This shows that even in Fiqh, the apostate forfeits his life because he is considered to be an enemy at war with the Muslims. And in the case of the apostate woman, the rule is laid down that she shall not be put to death, and the following argument is given: “Our reason for this is that the Holy Prophet forbade the killing of women, and because originally rewards (for belief or unbelief) are deferred to the latter abode, and their hastening (in this life) brings disorder, and a departure from this (principle) is allowed only on account of an immediate mischief and that is ḥirāb (war), and this cannot be expected from women on account of the unfitness of their constitution” (H. I, p. 577). And the annotator adds: “The killing for apostasy is obligatory in order to prevent the mischief of war, and it is not a punishment for the act of unbelief” (ibid.). And again: “For mere unbelief does not legalize the killing of a man” (ibid.). It will be seen that, as in the case of war against unbelievers, the legists are labouring under a misconception, and a struggle is clearly seen going on between the principles as established in the Holy Qur’ān and the misconceptions which had somehow or other found their way into the minds of the legists. It is clearly laid down that the apostate is killed, not on account of his unbelief but on account of ḥirāb or of his being in a state of war, and the argument is plainly given that killing for unbelief is against the accepted principles of Islām. But the misconception is that the mere