only imperfect and miniature images of the perfect and infinite attributes of the Divine Being, even as the reflecting mirror of human nature is itself imperfect and finite. For the very same reason, man’s exercise of these attributes is also subject to certain limitations and laws. Man’s knowledge of things, his exercise of power over things and his exercise of his will in relation to things stand on a par. All these are subject to limitations and laws. Man’s will stands in the same relation to the Divine will as his other attributes to the attributes of the Divine Being. He can exercise it under limitations and laws, and there is a very large variety of circumstances which may determine his choice in each case. Yet it is not true that the choice to exercise it has been taken away from him; and the fact is that, notwithstanding all the limitations, he is free to exercise his will, and, therefore, though he may not be responsible to the same extent for everything and in all cases — and a variety of circumstances must determine the extent of his responsibility, which may be very small, almost negligible, in some cases, and very great in others — yet he is a free agent and responsible for what he does.

The Quranic verses bearing on this subject may be considered. The argument that man does an evil deed because God wills it so, is put into the mouth of the opponents of the Holy Prophet on several occasions. For instance: “The polytheists say: If Allāh had pleased, we would not have set up aught with Him, nor our fathers, nor would we have made anything unlawful. Thus did those before them reject (the truth) until they tasted our punishment. Say, Have you any knowledge so you would bring it forth to Us? You only follow a conjecture and you only tell lies. Say, Then Allāh’s is the conclusive argument; so if He had pleased, He would have guided you all” (6:149, 150). The polytheists’ contention here is that what they do is in accordance with the will of God, and this is condemned as a mere conjecture and a lie. And against it, two arguments are adduced. The first is that previous people were punished when they persisted in their evil courses; if what they did was because God had so willed it, He would not have punished them for it. The second is that God had never said so through any of His prophets: “Have you any knowledge with you so you should bring it forth to Us?” And in the verse that follows, the argument is carried further: “If He had willed, He would